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ABSTRACT 
Elicia Parker Cowins:  Does Hedge Accounting Reflect Firms‟ Risk Management Activities? 
(Under the direction of Wayne R. Landsman) 
 
In this study, I examine the hedge accounting disclosures required under ASC Topic 815, 
i.e., SFAS 133 (as amended), to investigate whether existing hedge accounting criteria reflect the 
risk management activities of a set of non-financial firms.  I begin by partitioning a sample of 
firms into conventional hedgers and speculative hedgers based on a quantitative measure 
designed to summarize the criteria that must be met for the fair value gains and losses from a 
firm‟s derivative contracts to be recognized under the hedge accounting exception.  This 
quantitative measure is subsequently augmented to include qualitative factors in an effort to 
further refine it.  I then conduct a series of tests to evaluate whether the partitions exhibit 
characteristics associated with risk management or speculation.   
I find descriptive evidence that (1) speculative hedgers are riskier than conventional 
hedgers; (2) there is no association between residual exposure to macroeconomic risk and total 
firm risk for conventional hedgers; (3) there is a positive association between residual exposure 
to commodities prices and total firm risk for speculative hedgers; (4) speculative hedgers 
operate in more opaque information environments relative to those of conventional hedgers; 
and, (5) speculative hedgers have more short-term shareholders.   In the aggregate, these results 
suggest hedge accounting criteria does reflect risk management activities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 On May 10, 2012, J.P. Morgan Chase announced that its London-based Chief Investment 
Office (CIO) suffered trading losses of a little over $2 billion related to its positions in credit 
derivatives.  By July 13th, 2012, these losses had escalated to $5.8 billion and ultimately reached 
$6.2 billion.  On the after-hours conference call held to announce the initial loss, Jamie Dimon, 
Chase‟s Chairman and CEO said:  
Regarding what happened, the synthetic credit portfolio was a strategy to hedge 
the Firm’s overall credit exposure [emphasis added], which is our largest risk 
overall in its trust credit environment. 1  We‟re reducing that hedge.  But in 
hindsight, the new strategy was flawed, complex, poorly reviewed, poorly 
executed and poorly monitored.  The portfolio has proven to be riskier, more 
volatile and less effective an economic hedge than we thought.   
Was J.P. Morgan‟s position in this particular case truly a strategy to hedge against its 
exposure to credit risk or was it a speculative position?2  Is it even possible to make a clear 
distinction between the two?  In this study, I examine the disclosures required under ASC Topic 
815 to investigate whether hedge accounting criteria provides information about a firm‟s risk 
                                                          
1 In prepared testimony read before the Senate Committee on Banking in the weeks following the loss 
disclosure, Dimon asserts more specifically that the CIO‟s losses on the hedge were the result of a 
modification to the firm‟s synthetic credit portfolio (SCP) made to reduce risk-weighted assets.  The 
strategy essentially called for the addition of what traders believed would be offsetting positions, i.e., the 
CIO began selling CDSs to offset the risk exposure from the CDSs it had purchased. 
 
2 Initial comments provided by Dimon and others representing the bank claimed that the losses were 
associated with a hedge position.  However, considering (1) the SCP had previously been a profitable 
venture held by the CIO, a fact that could in and of itself suggest risk management was not the motivation; 
(2) the results of an investigation by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs that found evidence of an increasing appetite for risk in the CIO, i.e., the implementation of a new 
Value-at-Risk model that facilitated the build-up of risky positions in the portfolio; and (3) recent Justice 
Department charges of conspiracy to hide losses in the portfolio that were levied on former JP Morgan 
traders, mounting evidence suggests the strategy was more indicative of a speculative position. 
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management practices.3  My particular interest is in determining whether the external financial 
statement user can make the distinction between firms using derivatives to hedge risk and those 
using them to speculate under current guidance or if there is evidence to suggest that the 
standard is not useful for this purpose.   
At an elementary level, a hedger should have (1) an exposure to a particular risk as a 
result of its normal business operations, e.g., cash flow volatility, and (2) the desire to insure 
against that risk.  Conversely a speculator is the party who assumes the risk that the hedger 
wishes to transfer (Johnson, 1960).  Several issues complicate the application of these rather 
rudimentary definitions of hedgers and speculators in practice.  First, derivatives expose the 
firm to different types of risk directly related to the contracts themselves.4  A successful risk 
management program must consider how these incremental risks contribute to the overall risk 
profile of the firm and manage them accordingly.  Second, the manner in which a firm chooses 
to hedge against its risk exposure can result in an overall increase in exposure to the very risk 
the firm was attempting to reduce. 5  In other words, firms may ultimately be speculating, i.e., 
taking a view, under the guise of risk management.  Survey evidence, e.g., Bodner, Hayt and 
                                                          
3 Although financial reporting outcomes that are reflective of a firm‟s risk management practices are not 
an explicit objective of hedge accounting under ASC Topic 815, language in the basis for conclusions 
suggests risk management and speculation should nonetheless yield different reporting outcomes under 
the existing standard.  This issue will be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent section.   
 
4 Unsettled derivative positions expose firms to different types of risks including counterparty credit risk 
and liquidity risk.  Counterparty credit risk is associated with derivative contracts with a positive fair 
value and is the risk that the derivative counterparty will fail to meet its obligations under the contract.  
Exposure to this risk is greater when derivative contracts are traded over-the-counter as opposed to on 
organized exchanges.  Liquidity risk exposure is associated with derivative contracts with a negative fair 
value and is the result of contract terms that require a firm to post increasing amounts of collateral as 
prices move in favor of the derivatives counterparty. 
 
5 This can occur when a risk management strategy is only successful in hedging exposure under certain 
market conditions.  One example of such a strategy is the “stack and roll” strategy implemented by 
Metallgesellschaft (MG) in the early 90‟s.  MG was exposed to price risk as a result of entering into long-
term forward contracts, with maturities of 5 to10 years, obligating the firm to deliver heating oil to its 
customers at a fixed price.  The firm hedged against this risk by entering into short-term futures contracts 
that it closed out immediately before expiration, say monthly or quarterly, and replaced with a new set of 
short-term contracts.  This strategy is effective as long as the forward price of the relevant commodity, oil 
in this case, is lower than the spot price.  However, if the forward price exceeds the spot price, the short-
term futures contracts are being rolled-over with losses.  The interested reader is directed to Edwards and 
Canter (1995) for further detail on the topic. 
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Marston (1996), suggests that this does indeed occur.  As a result, one can conclude that 
expressed intent is not a sufficient condition for determining whether a firm‟s derivative 
positions are in effect reducing or increasing exposure to risk.    
In an effort to increase transparency regarding a firm‟s derivative use, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued SFAS 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments 
and Hedging Activities, which requires recognition of all derivative contracts on the face of the 
statement of financial position.  The associated fair value gains and losses are reported as a 
component of earnings unless the derivative instrument meets the criteria for hedge accounting 
treatment.  The hedge accounting exception mitigates the earnings volatility associated with fair 
value recognition of derivative instruments by allowing firms to either (1) bypass the income 
statement and recognize the gains and losses on derivatives designated as cash flow hedges in 
comprehensive income until such time as the gain or loss associated with the hedged transaction 
affects earnings or (2) recognize the hedged item in a fair value hedging relationship at fair value 
thereby appropriately matching the fair value gains and losses on the derivative with the gains 
and losses on the hedged item. 
The criteria that must be met to obtain hedge accounting treatment have been 
characterized as overly restrictive and overly burdensome resulting in reporting outcomes 
inconsistent with the risk management activities of the firm (Comiskey and Mulford, 2008).  
However, it is possible that the restrictive nature of the criteria for hedge accounting treatment 
serves a purpose.  Prior literature, e.g., Hodder, Hopkins and Wahlen (2006), has shown that 
the incremental volatility associated with the recognition of fair value gains and losses from 
derivative financial instruments provides risk-relevant information.   By restricting hedge 
accounting treatment to a small set of derivative activities that demonstrate the capacity to 
reduce a firm‟s exposure to risk, it is possible the moderation of incremental earnings volatility 
associated with derivatives reported under the hedge accounting exception serves to provide 
information to the market about the relative risks of certain derivative positions.  More 
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specifically, derivatives that do not substantially increase earnings volatility, e.g., those that 
meet hedge accounting criteria, are potentially less risky than those that do.  This is not to say 
that the derivative activities that fail to meet the hedge accounting standard are absolutely 
riskier or more speculative in nature, only that their effects on the exposure profile of the firm 
are potentially more difficult to discern. 
  To investigate whether hedge accounting reflects firms‟ risk management activities, I 
partition a set of quarterly observations for non-financial firms that employ derivatives in their 
risk management programs into quintiles using a quantitative, accounting based measure 
designed to summarize the criteria that must be met for the fair value gains and losses from a 
firm‟s derivative contracts to be recognized under the hedge accounting exception.6  If these 
criteria are in alignment with a firm‟s risk management activities, the observations that score 
the highest should exhibit characteristics of conventional hedgers while the observations that 
score the lowest should exhibit characteristics of speculative hedgers.7 8  If, however, these 
criteria are out of alignment with a firm‟s risk management activities, characteristics of the firms 
in each partition should be more ambiguous with either or both groups exhibiting the traits of 
conventional and speculative hedging strategies. 
                                                          
6 I do not use financial services firms in this study primarily because of my concern regarding the 
feasibility of obtaining a sample of firms with sufficient cross-sectional variation in the proportion of 
derivatives designated as accounting hedges.  Through casual observation of the 50 largest U.S. financial 
firms, I find that over half of them hold the vast majority of their derivatives in their trading book for 
market making as opposed to being held for use by the firm itself.  These positions are not eligible for 
hedge accounting treatment, rendering the metric I propose to use as a partitioning mechanism 
meaningless in this setting. 
 
7 Conventional hedgers are firms whose risk management objective is variance minimization, i.e., the 
equal attenuation of exposure to downside risk and upside potential.  Speculative hedgers are firms whose 
risk management objective is focused on reducing downside risk while preserving as much of the upside 
as possible.  The interested reader is directed to Stulz (1996) for more background on this notion of 
selective hedging techniques.   
 
8 I use the terms conventional hedger and hedger as well as speculative hedger and speculator 
interchangeably throughout the paper.  The more formal classifications, conventional and speculative 
hedgers, are more precise terms as I posit that speculation in this setting is occurring within firms‟ hedge 
portfolios. 
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Guidance regarding empirical proxies or tests that could be used to distinguish between 
hedging and speculation is scarce.  One archival study that attempts to make the distinction 
between the two, Zhang (2009), does so by documenting a change in a firm‟s risk exposure after 
the implementation of a derivatives risk management program.  Firms that exhibit a decrease in 
exposure to a particular risk are classified as hedgers or effective risk managers while those that 
exhibit an increase in exposure to a particular risk are classified as speculators or ineffective risk 
managers.  My use of a sample of firms with established derivatives risk management programs 
precludes the use of a change in risk exposures as a means to validate or invalidate the 
accounting based measure employed to partition firms into their respective groups.  Instead, I 
conduct a series of tests motivated by theory and intuition to investigate whether the resulting 
partitions exhibit characteristics associated with risk management or speculation as intended. 
First, I examine the difference in risk profiles across partitions.  If hedge accounting 
reflects firms‟ risk management activities, I expect firms classified as conventional hedgers 
based on my partitioning measure will on average exhibit a lower risk profile relative to those 
classified as speculative hedgers.  Using several proxies for risk, including accounting-based 
measures, market-based measures, and measures of exposure to macroeconomic risks, i.e., 
exposure to interest rates, foreign exchange rates and commodities prices, I find that 
conventional hedgers are on average less risky than speculative hedgers. 
Next, I estimate the relation between firms‟ residual exposures to macroeconomic risk, 
i.e., their exposures to interest rates, foreign exchanges and commodities prices after hedging, 
and total firm risk via ordinary least squares regression.  I predict the residual exposure to 
macroeconomic risk will exhibit no relation to total firm risk for conventional hedgers because 
these firms will have successfully hedged against those risks.  Conversely, I predict the residual 
exposure to macroeconomic risk will exhibit a positive association with total firm risk for 
speculative hedgers because their objective is to preserve exposure to upside potential while 
reducing or eliminating exposure to downside risk.   
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Consistent with predictions, I find that exposure to foreign exchange rates and 
commodities prices are not associated with total firm risk for conventional hedgers.  I also find a 
marginally significant negative association between exposure to interest rates and total firm risk 
for conventional hedgers, but this result is not robust to correction for serial correlation of the 
residuals. With respect to speculative hedgers, I find a significantly positive association between 
residual exposure to commodities prices and total firm risk consistent with predictions.  I also 
find no relation between exposure to interest rates and risk and a negative relation between 
exposure to foreign exchange rates and risk for these firms.  However, the negative relation 
between exposure to foreign exchange rates and risk disappears as expected when the 
partitioning measure is adjusted to correct for a misclassification of firms using foreign 
exchange derivatives that will be detailed in a subsequent section. 
Finally, I examine the relation between the classification of each firm-quarter 
observation and the firm‟s information environment and shareholder base.  Specifically, I obtain 
multinomial logistic regression coefficient estimates for a set of hypothesized predictors where 
the dependent variable, RANK, is a categorical variable from 1-5 decreasing in the proportion of 
derivatives designated as accounting hedges.  If hedge accounting criteria reflects risk 
management, this ordering is also decreasing in the likelihood that the hedge portfolio 
associated with the observation contains a relatively small speculative component.  This test is 
motivated by a theoretical result from Melumad, Weyns and Ziv (1999).  Melumad et al. finds 
that when a manager possesses superior information relative to current and potential 
shareholders and when the firm‟s shareholder base is comprised of more short-term 
shareholders, his hedge position is distorted, i.e., lower relative to the public information case.  I 
use an aggregate measure of firm-level transparency and a single proxy for the investment  
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horizon of a firm‟s shareholder base, share turnover, in my primary analysis.9  I find that the 
information environment and shareholder base of a firm contribute to the probability of an 
observation being classified as a speculative hedger in the predicted direction and interpret this 
result as further evidence in support of using hedge accounting as a means to distinguish 
hedging from speculation. 
This study contributes to the literature that examines the risk-management practices of 
non-financial firms.  Although this literature is vast, particularly in the finance area, I believe I 
have identified a yet unexplored area with respect to the identification of different risk 
management behaviors via financial reporting outcomes.  Further, while a few studies 
investigate whether risk management or speculation is on average the primary objective of the 
aggregate derivatives market, e.g., Hentschel and Kothari (2001) and Ciner (2006), this is the 
first, to the best of my knowledge, to propose a means to distinguish firms using derivatives as 
hedges from those using derivatives to speculate that could be applied to a broad set of 
derivatives users.     
This research could have policy implications and therefore may be of interest to standard 
setters, given the FASB is considering relaxing the hedge accounting criteria under ASC Topic 
815.  The evidence contained herein is more consistent with the notion that the existing hedge 
accounting rules and associated disclosures might be useful for distinguishing risk management 
from speculation than the notion that they are overly restrictive and fail to reflect the risk 
management activities of the firm.  Therefore, caution should be employed in attempts to alter 
hedge accounting criteria as the Board could inadvertently reduce the quality of information 
supplied to the market regarding a firm‟s exposure to risk.  Researchers could also find these 
results of interest when addressing research questions predicated on an assumption that 
derivatives users are using them to manage risk as opposed to using them to speculate. 
                                                          
9 The aggregate measure I use is very similar to the transparency measure employed by Lang, Lins and 
Maffett (2012) as it is the average decile rank of seven proxies for a firm‟s information environment, i.e., 
two earnings smoothness measures, analyst forecast error, analyst following, forecast dispersion, firm age 
and bid-ask spread. 
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides institutional background 
on the existing hedge accounting standard as well as the related exposure drafts currently under 
consideration by the FASB and the IASB.  Section 3 articulates predictions for the series of tests 
that follow and Section 4 discusses the selection of the sample and the research design.  
Empirical results are presented in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes. 
2. INSTITUTIONAL DETAIL 
2.1. Hedge Accounting 
At present, financial reporting for derivative financial instruments is governed by SFAS 
133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, as amended (ASC Topic 
815) which states that all derivative instruments should be recognized in the statement of 
financial position at fair value.  Accounting for changes in the fair value of derivatives, i.e., gains 
and losses on derivative contracts, is contingent on whether that derivative has been designated 
as a hedging instrument.  Gains and losses on derivative instruments that fail to meet the 
criteria for hedge accounting treatment, or for which the firm elects not to apply hedge 
accounting are immediately recognized in earnings.  Gains and losses on derivative instruments 
that qualify for and are designated as hedging instruments are recognized in a manner such that 
the gains and losses on the hedging instrument, the derivative, are recognized in the same 
period as the gains and losses on the hedged item.  Hedge accounting is an exception to the rule 
regarding fair value recognition of derivatives and is permitted, in part, to address an artifact of 
the mixed attribute accounting model.     
Generally speaking, an entity may elect to designate a derivative instrument as either: (1) 
a hedge of the exposure to changes in the fair value of a recognized asset or liability, or of an 
unrecognized firm commitment, that are attributable to a particular risk (referred to as a fair 
value hedge) or (2) a hedge of the exposure to variability in the cash flows of a recognized asset 
or liability, or of a forecasted transaction, that is attributable to a particular risk (referred to as a 
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cash flow hedge).10  To qualify for fair value (cash flow) hedging designation, there must be 
formal documentation of the hedging relationship as well as the firm‟s risk management 
objective and strategy for undertaking the hedge.11  Further, the hedging relationship must be 
expected to be “highly effective”, both at inception and on an ongoing basis.12    Gains and losses 
on designated fair value hedging instruments are recognized in earnings as are the offsetting 
gains and losses on hedged items.  Gains and losses on designated cash flow hedging 
instruments are subject to effectiveness testing with the effective portion recognized as a 
component of other comprehensive income and reclassified to earnings in the same period(s) 
during which the hedged transaction affects earnings.  The remaining gains and losses on cash 
flow hedging instruments, i.e. the ineffective portion, are recognized immediately in earnings.   
2.2. FASB/IASB Current Projects  
Hedge accounting is a current issue on both the IASB‟s and the FASB‟s respective 
agendas.  Although the projects were initiated prior to the financial crisis, demand for increased 
transparency regarding an entity‟s exposure to derivative financial instruments has grown in its 
wake.  On May 26, 2010, the FASB issued an exposure draft proposing an update to the 
accounting for derivative instruments and hedging activities.  The main features of ASC Topic 
815 regarding hedge accounting are retained by the exposure draft including:  the types of items 
and transactions that are eligible for hedge accounting and the types of risks eligible as hedged 
risks.  However, one substantive change relevant to this study is that the hedge effectiveness 
criterion under the proposed update requires that the hedging relationship be reasonably 
                                                          
10 Derivative instruments used to hedge against foreign currency exposures are addressed separately in 
the standard, but generally fall into one of three categories: cash flow hedge, fair value hedge or net 
investment hedge.  Net investment hedges are one of the few exceptions to the rule that non-derivative 
financial instruments cannot be designated as hedging instruments. 
 
11 Additional documentation requirements include identification of the hedging instrument and hedged 
item, the nature of the risk being hedged and how the hedging instrument‟s effectiveness will be assessed. 
 
12 A “highly effective” bright line is not explicit in the standard.  However, in practice, a highly effective 
hedging instrument generally offsets no less than 80% and no more than 120-125% of the change in fair 
value or cash flow of a hedged item. 
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effective, as opposed to highly effective, in achieving offsetting changes in fair values or cash 
flows attributable to the hedged risk during the period of the hedging relationship.13  In effect, 
this would lower the bar for derivative contracts to qualify for and enjoy the benefits of hedge 
accounting treatment. 
The IASB released a separate exposure draft, ED/2010/13, on December 9, 2010 to 
propose significant changes to existing IFRS hedge accounting requirements under IAS 39 to 
provide more useful hedge accounting information.  On February 9, 2011, the FASB issued a 
discussion paper and an invitation to comment on the IASB Exposure Draft as the proposals 
under the IASB ED could be characterized as further escalating the differences that currently 
exist between U.S. GAAP and IFRS in the area of hedge accounting.14 15 A useful starting point 
for a discussion on the merits of either proposal is a thorough examination of the financial 
reporting outcomes of the current standards.  My review of the academic literature has revealed 
precious little empirical research on the topic.   With this research, I hope to begin to fill this 
void.   
My review of SFAS 133 does not reveal a concise, explicit set of objectives for hedge 
accounting.  However, in the basis for conclusions of the standard, the FASB states, “Hedge 
accounting for assets and liabilities initially arose as a means of compensating for situations in 
which measurement anomalies between a hedged item and hedging instrument result in 
recognizing offsetting gains and losses in earnings in different periods.” (SFAS 133, as amended, 
                                                          
13 The Board states that it amended the hedge effectiveness requirements in ASC Topic 815 in an effort to: 
(1) reduce the complexity associated with qualifying for hedge accounting; (2) make it easier for firms to 
consistently apply hedge accounting; and (3) provide comparability and consistency in financial statement 
results (BC218). 
 
14 Existing differences between ASC Topic 815 and IAS 39 include, but are not limited to, the risk 
components that may be hedged as well as the way in which hedge effectiveness is assessed and 
measured. 
 
15 The IASB Exposure Draft essentially broadens the scope of hedge accounting by: (1) expanding the type 
of instruments eligible to be designated as hedging instruments; (2) expanding the type of items that may 
be designated as hedged items; (3) amending the criteria to qualify for hedge accounting; and, (4) 
permitting the rebalancing of a hedging relationship to be accounted for as a continuation of an existing 
hedge rather than a discontinuation. 
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Paragraph 320)  This suggests that hedge accounting is merely a tool used to provide resolution 
for artifacts of the accounting system that result from the mixed attribute accounting model.  
However, in addressing the criticism that the hedge accounting rules would not reflect the true 
economics of certain types of hedging and risk management activities, the Board states “…some 
aspects of „risk management‟  are hard to distinguish from speculation or „position taking‟ and 
speculative activities should not be afforded special accounting.” (SFAS 133, as amended, 
Paragraph 352)  The assertion that speculative activities should yield different financial 
reporting outcomes relative to hedging activities suggests another objective of hedge accounting 
is to distinguish hedgers from speculators.  Further, the disclosure amendment to SFAS 133, 
SFAS 161, states that one of its objectives is “to provide users of financial statements with an 
enhanced understanding of how and why an entity uses derivatives…”  The purpose of this study 
is to examine whether the standard, in its current form, is useful for determining which firms 
are using derivatives as a means to reduce exposure (hedging) and which firms are either 
unsuccessful in their attempt to reduce risk exposure (ineffective hedging) or deliberately using 
derivatives as a means to increase exposure (speculation). 
The hedge accounting rules under ASC Topic 815 could be considered a rather blunt 
instrument for the purpose of distinguishing risk management from speculation.  As of the end 
of the comment period, the FASB received 71 comment letters in response to its discussion 
paper and invitation to comment issued to solicit input on the IASB‟s exposure draft.  One of the 
common themes that emerged from an analysis of the comment letters is support for a more 
principles-based approach to hedge accounting that would include aligning hedge accounting 
more closely with risk management strategies.16  The criticism that the hedge accounting rules 
                                                          
16 The IASB exposure draft proposes an objective for hedge accounting that attempts to marry two 
extreme objectives, one that was deemed too broad and the other too narrow in focus.  The Board‟s 
proposed objective is “to represent in the financial statements the effect of an entity‟s risk management 
activities that use financial instruments to manage exposures arising from particular risks that could 
affect profit or loss.” 
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under ASC Topic 815 do not reflect an entity‟s risk management activities is not a new one.  In 
fact, the FASB addresses this issue in the basis for conclusions of the original standard. 
However, there is little agreement about just what the economics of hedging and 
risk management are.  Because entities have different and often conflicting views 
of risk and risk management, a single approach to hedge accounting could not 
fully reflect the hedging and risk management strategies of all entities…Thus 
providing hedge accounting to the whole range of activities undertaken by some 
under the broad heading of risk management would be inconsistent with 
improving the usefulness and understandability of financial reporting. (SFAS 133, 
as amended, Paragraph 352) 
In addition to the fundamental issue associated with developing a set of standards 
capable of distinguishing risk management from speculation for a broad set of firms, there are at 
least two further empirical challenges related to using hedge accounting in an effort to 
differentiate risk management from speculation.  First, hedge accounting is not mandatory.  
Therefore, it is entirely possible that firms using derivatives to manage risk choose not to 
designate their derivative instruments as accounting hedges and allow the effect of the 
mismatch between the fair value gains and losses from derivative hedging instruments and the 
gains and losses from hedged transactions to remain in their results from operations.  This could 
occur because meeting the requirements for hedge accounting treatment and continually 
assessing the effectiveness of hedging relationships is not a costless activity.  Thus, if the 
perceived benefits of risk management exceed the costs of the incremental earnings volatility 
that may result from not using hedge accounting, it is reasonable to expect firms could elect to 
not designate some or all of their derivatives as accounting hedges.   
Second, SFAS 159 The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities 
allows firms to opt to measure certain financial instruments at fair value.  Thus, firms can, under 
certain circumstances, achieve the same reporting outcomes for undesignated hedging 
relationships as they can under the hedge accounting exception.  In the extreme case that all of a 
firm‟s hedged items meet the criteria established under SFAS 159 and are measured at fair 
value, hedge accounting is unnecessary.  As will be discussed in the research design section 
below, I attempt to address these challenges by augmenting my partitioning measure to include 
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both quantitative and qualitative characteristics of firms in my sample.  More specifically, I 
incorporate qualitative data with respect to those firm-quarter observations with a high 
proportion of undesignated derivatives, as it is these observations for which the alternative 
explanations are particularly relevant. 
3. PREDICTIONS 
 To investigate whether the partitioning metrics developed on the basis of the reporting 
outcomes and disclosures provided under the existing hedge accounting standard yield 
partitions that exhibit characteristics associated with risk management or speculation, I conduct 
a series of tests motivated by both theory and intuition.17  I employ the use of three sets of tests 
in an attempt to validate a partitioning mechanism developed based on the criteria that must be 
met under the existing hedge accounting standard.  The objective is to find consistent evidence 
for or against the use of the measure as a means to distinguish hedging from speculation across 
the analyses.  Consistent evidence in support of its use would suggest that the hedge accounting 
criteria do reflect the risk management activities of the firm while evidence against would 
suggest that it does not. 
3.1. Risk Exposure 
3.1.1. Firm-Specific Risk Characteristics 
 If hedge accounting reflects firms‟ risk management activities, I expect that firms 
classified as conventional hedgers will on average appear to be less risky than firms classified as 
speculative hedgers.  However, it is entirely possible that by partitioning on the proportion of 
derivatives designated as accounting hedges, I am distinguishing accounting hedgers from 
                                                          
17 All tests that follow as described in the research design section are in fact joint tests of my predictions 
and my ability to classify firms as conventional hedgers and speculative hedgers.  It is my view that 
potential misclassification bias, in this case, works against me.  Misclassification is the result of either (1) 
derivative contracts that meet hedge accounting criteria but represent speculative activity or (2) derivative 
contracts that fail hedge accounting criteria but represent risk management activity.  Either case would 
result in a bias against predictions. 
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economic hedgers as opposed to conventional hedgers from speculative hedgers. 18  If this is the 
case, the relative risk characteristics of the two partitions will vary as a function of the risk proxy 
examined.  In order to allow for this possibility, I use two accounting-based risk measures 
(earnings and cash flow volatility), three market-based risk measures (beta, idiosyncratic 
volatility and equity volatility) and three macroeconomic risk measures (exposure to interest 
rates, foreign exchange rates and commodities prices).  If my partitioning measure is capturing 
the differences between accounting hedgers and economic hedgers, I expect firms with a high 
proportion of derivatives designated as accounting hedges will exhibit smaller earnings and cash 
flow volatilities but greater equity and idiosyncratic volatilities as well as market betas and 
exposure to macroeconomic risk relative to firms with a lower proportion of derivatives 
designated as accounting hedges. 
3.1.2. Macroeconomic Exposure and Total Firm Risk 
Without exception, the primary purpose of holding derivative contracts for sample firms 
is to hedge against exposure to one or more  macroeconomic risks.  Because my sample is 
comprised of firms that actively use derivatives as part of their risk management programs, I 
cannot observe their risk exposures prior to their hedge position and therefore cannot use a 
change in exposure to validate my partitioning measure.  However, I can make predictions about 
whether and how firms‟ residual exposures to macroeconomic risk should be related to total 
firm risk and how those associations should vary across partitions.  If a firm has effectively 
hedged its exposure to a particular macroeconomic risk, then total firm-wide risk should not 
vary with residual exposure to that same macroeconomic risk, i.e., that risk should not 
                                                          
18 The divergent outcomes that result from a focus on accounting earnings versus a focus on economic 
earnings in this context were examined in Hughen (2010) with a study of the behavior of a sample of firms 
that had previously been subject to a restatement as a result of the misapplication of the hedge accounting 
standard.  Hughen classifies firms as accounting hedgers (AH) and economic hedgers (EH) based on 
whether the firm chooses to take the steps necessary to ensure its hedging derivatives qualify for hedge 
accounting treatment (AH) or to continue with the economic hedge regardless of its effects on earnings 
volatility (EH) in order to investigate the conditions under which a firm would focus on accounting 
earnings over economic earnings.  She finds that firms that were able to meet earnings targets in the 
period before the restatement are more likely to focus on accounting earnings.  
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contribute to the overall risk profile of the firm.  Conversely, if the firm has been ineffective in 
hedging macroeconomic risk, then total firm-wide risk should be increasing in the residual 
exposure to that same macroeconomic risk.  Thus, if hedge accounting reflects firms‟ risk 
management activities, the residual macroeconomic risk exposures of firms classified as 
conventional hedgers should exhibit no association with total risk while those of firms classified 
as speculative hedgers should exhibit a positive association with total risk.  
3.2. Information Environment and Shareholder Base 
Melumad, Weyns and Ziv (1999) examines, in an analytical framework, the effects of 
alternative approaches to hedge accounting on managerial hedging decisions and shareholder 
wealth.  Melumad et al. begins by deriving the optimal hedge position based on a full 
information environment and subsequently investigates how the manger‟s hedge decision 
differs from the optimal in an environment where the manager has superior information relative 
to current and potential shareholders.  Melumad et al. finds that when the manager possesses 
superior information relative to current and potential shareholders, and shareholders must infer 
the valuation relevant information, quantity exposure and the hedge decision, from the financial 
reports, the manager‟s hedge decision is contingent on the reporting environment.  In a hedge 
accounting regime similar to the one that exists under ASC Topic 815, the manager‟s hedge 
decision is distorted relative to the public information case.  Specifically, the speculative portion 
of the hedge position is increasing in the uncertainty about the firm‟s exposure as well as the 
proportion of short-term shareholders.   
The intuition behind this result is that because the firm‟s risk exposure is unobservable 
to the market, new investors are exposed to greater (information) risk which in turn reduces 
their willingness to invest in the firm. Consequently, for a given hedge position, share price is 
lower purely as a result of a difference in the information environment as opposed to the risk 
characteristics of the firm.  In other words, the capital market benefits of hedging are reduced; 
thus, the manager responds by reducing his hedge position, i.e., the costs of hedging, in an effort 
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to reduce the negative effect of hedging on firm value.19 20  Thus, if hedge accounting reflects risk 
management, I predict that the probability the firm will have a high proportion of speculative 
derivatives, i.e., undesignated derivative contracts, is increasing in the opacity of a firm‟s 
information environment and decreasing in the investment horizon of the firm‟s shareholders. 
4. DATA, SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1. Data and sample selection 
The data used for this study come from three sources.  The first is a unique set of 
manually collected quarterly footnote data related to a firm‟s derivative gains and losses for the 
first fiscal quarter of 2009 through the last calendar quarter of 2012.21 22  SFAS 161 requires 
enhanced disclosures about an entity‟s derivative and hedging activities including:  (1) gross fair 
value amounts segregated between derivatives that are designated as hedging instruments and 
those that are not, with subcategories by type of contract, i.e., interest rate, foreign exchange, 
commodity, etc.; (2) the location and amount of the derivative gains and losses reported in the 
                                                          
19 Assuming markets are imperfect, the primary capital market benefit of risk management is the 
reduction in capital costs achieved via management‟s efforts to avoid the adverse affects of financial 
distress on shareholder value.  In other words, by reducing the volatility of cash flows, management can 
preserve shareholder value by minimizing the costs of financial distress, i.e., bankruptcy costs or 
opportunity costs associated with declined positive NPV projects.  In return, shareholders will require a 
lower rate of return (Fatemi and Luft, 2002).  The costs of risk management include the direct costs 
associated with initiating the hedge itself as well as indirect costs associated with administration of the 
hedge (Fatemi and Luft, 2002).  The extent to which management engages in risk management activity is 
contingent on the relation between these and other costs and benefits. 
 
20 The focus of this study is risk management via the use of derivative contracts.  It is entirely possible, 
however, that firms use other, possibly less costly, means to minimize the adverse affects of their risk 
exposure.  The extent to which alternative risk management tools are employed by the firms in my sample 
is unclear.  However, because the sample is limited to firms that manage at least a portion of their risk 
with derivatives and because the relation being tested is that between the type of derivative held by a firm 
and its information environment as opposed to the relation between a firm‟s residual risk, after risk 
management, and its information environment, I expect cross-sectional variation in the use of such 
techniques will have a minimal affect on the inferences drawn from the results.  
 
21 Footnote data are acquired from 10-Q and 10-K reports submitted to the SEC and available via the 
Commission‟s electronic data gathering, analysis and retrieval system, EDGAR. 
 
22 The standard requiring expanded disclosures for derivative instruments and hedging activities, SFAS 
161, is effective for fiscal years and interim periods beginning after November 15, 2008.  Although early 
application was encouraged, the firms in my sample implemented expanded disclosures beginning in the 
first fiscal quarter of 2009.  In order to preserve the maximum number of observations, I do not omit 
firms whose fiscal year is not a calendar year.  As a result, I have an unbalance panel with observations per 
firm ranging from 13 to 16. 
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statement of financial performance or statement of financial position presented separately for 
hedging instruments and hedged items in a fair value hedge; (3) the effective portion of gains 
and losses on derivative instruments designated as cash flow and net investment hedges 
recognized in OCI during the current period; (4) the effective portion of gains and losses 
reclassified into earnings during the current period; (5) the amount of hedge ineffectiveness as 
well as the amount excluded from the assessment of hedge effectiveness; and, (6) the gains and 
losses on derivative instruments not designated as hedging instruments.  These quantitative 
disclosures are required for every annual and interim reporting period for which the statements 
of financial position and performance are presented and must be presented in tabular format.    
To be included in the sample, a firm must have had a non-zero balance on the statement of 
financial position for derivative assets or liabilities for all four fiscal years 2009 – 2012.  I 
acquire all other accounting data from Compustat and monthly and quarterly firm and market 
returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
4.2. Research Design 
I posit that whether a firm is hedging or speculating with respect to its derivative 
positions is difficult to determine, at times even for the firm itself.  Therefore, as an external user 
of financial information, management‟s assertions as to the nature of the firm‟s derivative use 
are insufficient to determine whether those positions are actually increasing or decreasing risk 
exposure.  The objective of this research is to evaluate whether hedge accounting and associated 
disclosures can be used as a tool to distinguish derivative activity that is more consistent with 
hedging risk from derivative activity that is more consistent with speculation.  In that spirit, I 
begin by identifying a sample of firms self-identified as those who use derivatives for risk 
management purposes based on their footnote disclosures. 
The initial sample was obtained by generating a list of non-financial firms from 
Compustat sorted from largest to smallest based on total assets reported as of the 4th calendar 
quarter of 2009.  I then examined the footnote disclosures related to hedge accounting for all 
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quarterly periods from the first fiscal quarter of 2009 through the fourth calendar quarter of 
2012 to determine whether the firm held derivatives for risk management purposes and to 
retrieve the relevant quantitative disclosure data.  The manually collected data include amounts 
for the first 270 unique firms that had non-zero quarterly balances for derivative 
assets/liabilities on the statement of financial position, approximately 4,300 firm-quarter 
observations.  The analyses that follow, however, are based on fewer observations as a result of 
the data requirements for the remaining variables and, in some cases, the omission of the 
middle quintile of firms ranked based on the partitioning metric.   
4.2.1. Partitioning Variable 
The baseline partitioning metric I employ in this study is the ratio of derivative assets 
and liabilities designated as hedges to derivative assets and liabilities not designated as hedges.  
If hedge accounting criteria is a useful tool for distinguishing hedgers from speculators, firms 
with a greater proportion of derivatives designated as hedges should be engaged in derivative 
activities that are more consistent with risk management relative to the derivative activities of 
those with a greater proportion of undesignated hedges.  I do not consider the firm‟s net 
position in derivatives, i.e. the difference between its asset and liability positions, as I am 
attempting to capture a summary measure of the firm‟s derivative activity as a whole.  For this 
metric, firms in the 1st quintile are those whose entire derivatives portfolio meets the criteria for 
hedge accounting while firms in the 5th quintile are either those whose entire derivatives 
portfolio fails to meet the criteria for hedge accounting or those who elect not to account for 
some or all of their derivatives as accounting hedges.  
Because hedge accounting is not required, it is entirely possible that a firm has elected 
not to designate its derivatives as accounting hedges for one reason or another.  This represents 
a considerable research design issue because my objective is to investigate whether the criteria 
that must be met in order to obtain hedge accounting treatment is effective at distinguishing risk 
management activities from speculative activities.  If firms with a higher proportion of 
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derivatives not designated as accounting hedges are bypassing the criteria altogether by 
choosing not to use hedge accounting, the inferences that could be drawn from the results of my 
tests are questionable.  In an attempt to address this issue, I augment my baseline partitioning 
measure to include qualitative information.  This qualitative information either captures likely 
reasons the relative costs and benefits of implementing hedge accounting could result in a 
decision by management to forgo the hedge accounting exception or it serves to provide some 
intuitive refinement to the baseline quantitative partitioning measure. 23 
The first piece of qualitative information I incorporate into the baseline measure is the 
decision to use the fair value option.  SFAS 159, The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and 
Liabilities, allows firms to measure eligible items at fair value thus eliminating the accounting 
mismatch between hedging instruments and certain hedged items, and the associated earnings 
volatility, without applying complex hedge accounting provisions.  In the limit, a firm that is 
able to exercise the fair value option for all of its hedged items would not need to designate any 
derivatives as accounting hedges in order to obtain similar financial reporting outcomes as those 
achieved under the hedge accounting exception.  Using the baseline partitioning measure, such 
a firm would be classified as a speculative hedger observation when the opposite may be true.  
Under SFAS 159, firms that exercise the fair value option are required to provide information to 
facilitate the comparison between firms that choose alternative measurement attributes for 
similar assets and liabilities.24  For the purposes of this study, the only information I capture and 
use regarding the fair value option is whether the firm has made the election at any point during 
the sample period and I eliminate firm-quarter observations from the speculative hedger group, 
i.e., those in quintiles 4 and 5, that have done so. 
                                                          
23 In my tests, I consider the inclusion of each of these qualitative refinements individually because 
including them in a more comprehensive manner would result in a prohibitively small sample of 
speculative hedger observations for comparison. 
 
24 Disclosure requirements under SFAS 159 include management‟s reasons for electing the fair value 
option, the difference between aggregate fair value and aggregate unpaid principal balance of loans, 
receivables and payables for which the fair value option was elected as well as methods and assumptions 
used to estimate fair values.  
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Next, I consider cross-sectional variation in the reporting of comprehensive income.  
Prior literature (Hirst & Hopkins, 1998; Maines and McDaniel, 2000) suggests that the manner 
in which comprehensive income is presented, i.e., in a performance statement or as a 
component of shareholders‟ equity, affects how the capital markets interpret the information 
provided.  Maines and McDaniel (2000) finds that a group of nonprofessional investors assign 
more weight to the volatility of comprehensive income components when they are reported in a 
performance statement, such as a statement of comprehensive income.  This becomes important 
when one considers how hedge accounting, with respect to cash flow hedges, reduces earnings 
volatility.  By recognizing the fair value gains and losses on cash flow hedging instruments in 
comprehensive income until the hedged transaction affects earnings, the fair value volatility is 
essentially shifted from regular income to comprehensive income.  If the results of Maines and 
McDaniel (2000) hold more generally, the benefits of cash flow hedge accounting for firms that 
report comprehensive income in a performance statement are reduced.  This could explain why 
some firms opt not to use hedge accounting and provides an alternative explanation for why a 
firm has a higher proportion of undesignated derivative contracts.  To address this issue, I 
eliminate firm-quarter observations from the speculative hedger group, i.e., quintiles 4 and 5, 
when the firm reports comprehensive income in a performance statement.25 
Next I consider whether a firm‟s derivative contracts fail to meet the hedge accounting 
criteria or whether the firm elects not to use the hedge accounting provisions.  Including only 
those observations where derivatives are not designated as accounting hedges because they fail 
the criteria should result in a refinement of my baseline partitioning measure because it is more 
consistent with the focus of this study, which is to examine the criteria under the existing hedge 
accounting standard and its usefulness for distinguishing risk management from speculation.  I 
have attempted to glean this information from the footnotes and eliminate from the speculative 
                                                          
25 This variation ceases to be an issue for fiscal years and interim periods beginning after December 15, 
2011, the effective date of ASU 2011-05, Presentation of Comprehensive Income.  This amendment to the 
standards essentially requires all firms to report comprehensive income in a performance statement as 
opposed to a component of shareholder‟s equity. 
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hedger group, i.e., quintiles 4 and 5, firm-quarter observations where the firm explicitly states 
they elected not to use hedge accounting for any reason.  Although this should be the most ideal 
refinement, the manner in which this information is disclosed makes it difficult to obtain a clear 
separation.  Specifically, many firms state that they have undesignated derivatives that fail the 
criteria as well as those for which they have elected not to apply hedge accounting without 
providing information on the relative proportion of each.  Therefore, I eliminate all firm-quarter 
observations from the speculative hedger group where the firm has stated that it elects not to 
apply hedge accounting to any degree.   
The next piece of qualitative information I consider is the use of speculative or trading 
derivatives.  A relatively small number of firms admit to using some of their derivative contracts 
for other than risk management purposes.  An intuitive refinement of my baseline partitioning 
measure is to eliminate those firms that explicitly state that their derivatives are held solely for 
risk-management purposes.  However, there are at least two potential issues with this particular 
refinement.  First, it results in a relatively small speculative hedger sample for comparison 
purposes.  Considering a minimum of 13 observations per firm, in some instances the resulting 
sample is only comprised of 4 or 5 unique firms.  Second, it is entirely possible that a firm 
employs the use of selective hedging techniques that may technically fall under the category of 
risk management but practically look more like speculation (Stulz, 1996).  This refinement 
would eliminate such firms from consideration.  Nonetheless, I eliminate from the speculative 
hedger group, i.e., quintiles 4 and 5, firms that state in their disclosure that derivatives are only 
held for hedging purposes. 
Next, I consider those firms that use foreign exchange derivatives to hedge against 
remeasurement gains and losses on recognized assets and liabilities denominated in a foreign 
currency.  Foreign currency denominated assets and liabilities are remeasured at the end of each 
reporting period based on the currency rate at that point in time.  Therefore the fair value 
change on the hedging instrument will be offset by the remeasurement gain or loss reported in 
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the same period eliminating the need for hedge accounting designation.  This provides an 
alternative explanation for a higher proportion of undesignated derivative contracts.  Thus, I 
eliminate all firm-quarter observations from the speculative hedger group where the firm 
explicitly states they are using foreign exchange derivatives for this purpose. 
Finally, I consider the cost of restatement.  It is possible that firms elect to forgo the 
provisions under the hedge accounting standard because of the related complexity and potential 
for restatement (Comiskey and Mulford, 2008).  As opposed to trying to estimate the risk of or 
absolute costs associated with a restatement, I consider the relative cost of a restatement and 
assume that if a firm has experienced a restatement in a prior period, that firm would be less 
likely to use hedge accounting.  This provides an alternative explanation for a higher proportion 
of undesignated contracts.  Therefore, I eliminate all firm-quarter observations from the 
speculative hedger group where the firm has had a restatement for any reason. 
4.2.2. Risk Exposure Analyses 
 The first test I employ is a univariate test of means to investigate (1) whether the firm-
specific risk characteristics between the conventional and speculative hedger partitions differ 
and (2) whether the augmented partitioning measures result in a greater distinction between 
conventional and speculative hedger observations relative to the baseline partitioning measure.  
In this test, I use accounting-based risk measures (earnings and cash flow volatilities, 
EARN_VOL and CFO_VOL), market-based risk measures (beta, BETA, idiosyncratic volatility, 
FIRMRSK, and equity volatility, VOLE) and macroeconomic risk measures (exposure to interest 
rates, foreign exchange rates and commodities prices, IREXP, FXEXP and COMMEXP) to allow 
for the possibility that my partitioning measure is capturing the distinction between accounting 
hedgers and economic hedgers.  Lower estimates across all eight risk proxies for conventional 
hedger firms vis-à-vis speculative hedger firms would provide evidence consistent with my 
predictions and the notion that the partitioning measure is capturing differences between risk 
management and speculation.  Conversely, lower (higher) estimates for accounting-based 
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(market-based and macroeconomic) risk measures for firms with a high proportion of 
derivatives designated as accounting hedges would provide evidence consistent with the notion 
that the partitioning measure is capturing differences between accounting hedgers and 
economic hedgers.    
Next, I use multivariate analysis to investigate whether the relation between total firm 
risk and the residual exposure to macroeconomic risk varies across partitions in a predictable 
manner.  To test my predictions, I estimate the following equation via ordinary least squares: 
 (1) VOLEi,t = θ0 + θ 1EXPOSUREi,t + Σθ 2-kCONTROLSi,t + ε. 
VOLE is a measure of total firm risk.  EXPOSURE is a firm-specific variable intended to capture 
a firm‟s exposure to interest rates, foreign exchange rates or commodities prices.  The set of 
control variables included in the regressions are those that have been shown in prior literature 
to vary with equity volatility and include leverage, LEV, book-to-market ratio, BTM, return on 
equity volatility, ROE_VOL, firm age, AGE, sales growth volatility, SGR_VOL, institutional 
investors, INST, and inverse price, INVPRC.  
To investigate how the relation between residual exposure to macroeconomic risk and 
total firm risk differs across partitions, I estimate equation (1) separately for SH = 1 and 0.  With 
respect to this analysis, SH is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms with 50% or more of their 
firm-quarter observations in the 4th or 5th quintile of observations ranked by the ratio of 
derivative assets and liabilities designated as accounting hedges.  In effect, the firms themselves 
are classified as conventional hedgers or speculative hedgers as opposed to the individual firm-
quarter observations as is the case for the univariate test above and the information 
environment analysis below.  This modification to the classification scheme is necessary because 
the macroeconomic risk exposure estimates employed in the analysis require a longer time-
series of data to estimate.   
The sample used to estimate equation (1) varies with the macroeconomic variable used 
as EXPOSURE.  Specifically, I restrict the sample to only those firms that have a nonzero 
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balance in derivative contracts related to the macroeconomic variable, i.e., when EXPOSURE is 
a proxy for exposure to interest rates, the sample is restricted to those firms that have interest 
rate derivative contracts.  A zero coefficient estimate on EXPOSURE, θ1 = 0, for conventional 
hedgers and a positive coefficient estimate on EXPOSURE, θ1 > 0, for speculative hedgers would 
provide evidence consistent with predictions and suggest that hedge accounting is useful for 
distinguishing risk management from speculation.  
4.2.3. Information Environment and Shareholder Base Analysis 
To test my predictions regarding the likelihood a firm would have a higher proportion of 
speculative derivatives given the degree of opacity in its information environment and the 
average investment horizon of its shareholder base, I estimate the following via multinomial 
logistic regression: 
 (2) RANK = Ψ0 + Ψ1TRANSi,t + Ψ2TURNOVERi,t + Ψ3SIZEi,t + Ψ4LEVERAGEi,t + 
Ψ5INTCOVi,t + Ψ6MTBi,t + ε. 
RANK is a categorical variable that takes on a value from 1 to 5 based on the ratio of derivatives 
designated as accounting hedges to derivatives not designated as hedges.  TRANS is an 
aggregate measure of a firm‟s information environment calculated as the average decile rank of 
two earnings smoothness measures, analyst forecast error, analyst following, dispersion in 
analyst forecasts, firm age and bid-ask spread .  A positive multinomial logistic coefficient 
estimate on TRANS, Ψ1 > 0, would provide evidence consistent with the prediction that the 
probability a firm will have a low proportion of speculative derivatives is increasing in 
transparency.  Following Ang and Cheng (2006), I use TURNOVER as the proxy for the 
investment horizon of a firm‟s shareholder base.  A negative multinomial logistic coefficient 
estimate on TURNOVER, Ψ2 < 0, would provide evidence consistent with the prediction that the 
probability a firm will have a low proportion of speculative derivatives is decreasing in the 
frequency of share turnover, i.e., increasing in the average investment horizon of the firm‟s 
shareholders.   
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I also include several variables that should predict whether a firm is engaged in risk 
management or speculative activities based on theories of hedging by value-maximizing 
corporations, e.g. Smith and Stulz (1985).26  I include size to capture the notion that large firms 
are more likely to self-insure their exposure to risk (Stulz, 1996).  In other words, larger firms 
should be more likely to have a large speculative component to their hedge portfolio relative to 
their smaller counterparts.  Evidence consistent with this intuition would yield a logit estimate 
on size that is less than zero, ψ3 < 0.  I include leverage and interest coverage ratio to capture the 
notion that firms hedge to reduce the costs of financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985).  Put 
differently, firms with relatively low levels of debt financing are more likely to have a large 
speculative component to their hedge portfolio relative to those with higher levels of debt.  
Evidence consistent with this theory would yield a coefficient estimate on leverage that is greater 
than zero, ψ4 > 0, and one on interest coverage ratio that is less than zero, ψ5 < 0.  Finally, I 
include the equity market-to-book ratio to capture the notion that firms hedge in an effort to 
curb inefficient investment (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993).  Assuming external capital is 
more costly than internal funds, firms with relatively large growth opportunities are more likely 
to hedge to ensure that internally generated cash flows do not fall below required levels (Glaum, 
2002).  Evidence consistent with this theory would yield a coefficient estimate on market-to-
book that is greater than zero, ψ5 > 0.  
 
 
 
                                                          
26 Classical finance theory suggests risk management is not a value maximizing activity.  However, in an 
attempt to explain the prevalence of risk management programs observed in reality, theories of value 
maximizing risk management have emerged and usually hinge on the identification of one form of market 
imperfection or another.  Empirical tests of these theories have not yielded compelling evidence in 
support of these theories.  Some have suggested, e.g., Glaum (2002) that the problem lies with the implicit 
assumption that all firms using derivatives are hedging.  Survey evidence suggests that firms engage in a 
spectrum of derivative activities that include “full-cover” hedging as well as “selective” hedging, the latter 
involving managers incorporating their views on the future movement of interest rates, exchange rates 
and commodity prices to ultimately affect their hedge ratios (Stulz, 1996).  Selective hedging would be 
more consistent with a speculative activity relative to full-cover hedging. 
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5. RESULTS 
5.1. Risk Exposure Results 
5.1.1. Firm-Specific Risk Characteristics 
Table 1 presents the risk characteristics of firms across partitions before and after the 
inclusion of qualitative information.  For all seven sets of results, the SH = 0 group consists of 
the firm-quarter observations where the ratio of derivatives designated as accounting hedges to 
derivatives not designated as accounting hedges is high.  For the  baseline results, the SH = 1 
group consists of the firm-quarter observations where the ratio of derivatives designated as 
accounting hedges to derivatives not designated as accounting hedges is low.  For the remaining 
six sets of results, the SH  = 1 group consists of the firm-quarter observations where the ratio of 
derivatives designated as accounting hedges to derivatives not designated is low and alternative 
types of firms are systematically excluded as described above.   
Consistent with my predictions, conventional hedgers are on average less risky than 
speculative hedgers and in most cases the difference is statistically significant at conventional 
levels.  The one exception in tests using the baseline measure is the exposure to commodities 
price risk which is slightly greater for conventional hedgers.  Further, the augmentation of the 
baseline quantitative partitioning measure is best improved either by excluding those firms that 
use foreign currency derivatives to hedge against remeasurment gains and losses on recognized 
assets and liabilities denominated in a foreign currency or by excluding those firms that report 
comprehensive income in a performance statement.  This conclusion is based on two factors.  
First, the risk profile across all eight risk metrics is lower for the SH = 0 group relative to the SH 
= 1 group under these two alternative scenarios.  Second, the difference between partitions 
across all eight risk metrics is significant at the 1% level under these two scenarios.  The baseline 
partitioning measure is also marginally improved by excluding those firms that exercised the 
fair value option.  The remaining proposed augmentations result in a more ambiguous split 
between the two groups.  
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5.1.2. Macroeconomic Exposure and Total Firm Risk 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the aggregate macroeconomic risk exposure 
samples separately for interest rate, foreign exchange rate and commodities price exposures 
(Panel A) as well as Pearson/Spearman correlations for the same (Panel B).  A cursory glance at 
the descriptive statistics reveals that on average, firms across all three samples are roughly the 
same size and age.  The foreign exchange rate exposure sample is slightly less levered than the 
other two samples and has fewer opportunities for growth, particularly relative to the interest 
rate exposure sample.  Pearson/Spearman correlations reveal that residual exposures to interest 
rates and foreign exchange rates for the aggregate sample are negatively related to risk, which 
suggests that these instruments are not being used to speculate, regardless of a firm‟s 
identification as a hedger or speculator.  The correlation between residual exposure to 
commodities prices and risk, however, is insignificant but positive which suggests there is some 
potential for variation across partitions.   
Table 3 presents the results of tests of the relation between residual exposure to 
macroeconomic risk and total firm risk using the baseline partitioning measure as well as the 
three augmented measures that yielded the greatest incremental increase in distinction between 
partitions, i.e. the exclusion of firms that exercise the fair value option, report comprehensive 
income in a performance statement and use derivatives to hedge gains and losses on recognized 
assets and liabilities denominated in a foreign currency.  For conventional hedgers, SH = 0, I 
find that residual exposure to foreign exchange rates and commodities prices exhibits no 
relation to total firm risk.  Residual exposure to interest rates exhibits a slight negative 
association with total firm risk; however, this result is not robust to correction for serial 
correlation of the residuals.  The results regarding the conventional hedger partition are 
consistent with my prediction and suggest that these firms were on average successful in 
hedging their exposures to macroeconomic risk.   
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Turning to the results for speculative hedgers, SH = 1, I find that residual exposure to 
interest rates exhibits no relation to total risk and residual exposure to foreign exchange rates 
exhibits a negative association.  The negative association between foreign exchange rates and 
total firm risk disappears, however, once the partitioning measure is augmented to exclude 
firms using derivatives to hedge gains and losses on recognized assets and liabilities 
denominated in a foreign currency (Model 4).  This result provides some support for this 
particular augmentation of the baseline partitioning measure.  The multivariate results 
regarding the relation between residual exposures to interest and foreign exchange rates and 
total risk for the speculative hedger group confirm inferences from previous examination of the 
correlations of these variables.  Specifically, interest rate and foreign exchange contracts are not 
being used, by the firms in this sample, to speculate.  However, the residual exposure to 
commodities prices is positively associated with total firm risk for the speculative hedger group, 
which is consistent with my prediction and suggests that sample firms are using commodities 
contracts for more speculative activities.   
5.2. Information Environment and Shareholder Base Results 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the aggregate sample used to test predictions 
regarding how a firm‟s information environment and shareholder base relate to the proportion 
of speculative derivatives, i.e. undesignated derivatives, held (Panel A) as well as sample means 
by RANK (Panel B).  Although the information environment (share turnover) variables do not 
decrease (increase) monotonically from RANK = 1 to RANK = 5, a comparison of the two 
extremes generally paints the picture of a more transparent information environment for firms 
in the conventional hedger category relative to that for firms in the speculative hedger category.  
Further, the share turnover variable suggests that the shareholder base of firms in the 
conventional hedger category has a longer investment horizon relative to that of the shareholder 
base of firms in the speculative hedger category.  Panel C of Table 4 presents the 
Pearson/Spearman correlations of the variables used in the information environment and share 
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turnover analysis and is provided primarily to demonstrate that the aggregate TRANS variable 
exhibits a significant positive correlation with its components.   
Table 5 presents the results of the information environment and share turnover analysis 
using the baseline partitioning measure as well as the three augmented measures presented in 
Table 3.  As implemented, the multinomial logistic regression models estimate the probability of 
a firm appearing in categories 1 – 4 relative to the reference category 5.  Models 1 through 4 
provide evidence consistent with my predictions.  Specifically, the multinomial logistic 
coefficient estimates associated with the TRANS (TURNOVER) variable are positive (negative) 
and significant across models.  These results are robust to correction for serial correlation of the 
residuals with the exception of the coefficient estimate on share turnover for RANK = 4 relative 
to RANK = 5 which loses significance.   These result are consistent with the notion that the more 
transparent the firm‟s information environment (the more short-term shareholders a firm has), 
the smaller (greater) the speculative portion of is hedge portfolio.   
6. CONCLUSION 
 The objective of this study is to investigate whether the criteria that must be met in order 
for the fair value gains and losses from a firm‟s derivative contracts to be recognized under the 
hedge accounting exception reflect firms‟ risk management activities.  Toward that end, I used 
the quantitative disclosures from annual and interim reporting periods for a set of non-financial 
firms to develop a partitioning measure meant to summarize the criteria.  I subsequently 
augment the quantitative measure with information from the qualitative disclosures in an effort 
to refine it.  I then conduct a series of tests to evaluate whether the partitions exhibit 
characteristics associated with risk management or speculation. I find descriptive evidence 
that (1) speculative hedgers are riskier than conventional hedgers; (2) there is no association 
between residual exposure to macroeconomic risk and total firm risk for conventional hedgers; 
(3) there is a positive association between residual exposure to commodities prices and total 
firm risk for speculative hedgers; (4) speculative hedgers operate in more opaque information 
 30 
environments relative to those of conventional hedgers; and, (5) speculative hedgers have a 
shareholder base with a relatively short investment horizon.  These results suggest hedge 
accounting criteria does reflect risk management activities.    
My interpretation of the results is subject to a number of caveats.  Because a firm‟s risk 
and the details regarding the strategy for managing that risk is unobservable to financial 
statement users, I necessarily rely on intuition and theory regarding the determinants of 
hedging versus speculative activities as well as firm-specific characteristics that could 
distinguish one from the other.  Further, I use empirical proxies to represent higher order 
constructs.  Thus, the analyses contained herein are essentially joint tests of the intuition and 
theory that motivate them and the validity of the constructs employed. 
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TABLE 1:  Firm-Specific Risk Characteristics 
This table presents information on how the risk characteristics differ across the conventional hedger 
and speculative hedger partitions.  For comparison purposes, the baseline partitioning measure, the 
ratio of derivatives designated as accounting hedges to undesignated derivatives, is presented as well as 
all augmented partitioning schemes.  In all cases, the SH = 0 group consists of firm-quarter 
observations where the ratio of derivatives designated as accounting hedges to derivatives not 
designated is greatest.  For the baseline results, the SH = 1 group consists of firm-quarter observations 
where the ratio of derivatives designated as accounting hedges to derivatives not designated is lowest.  
For the Fair Value Option results, the SH = 1 group excludes those firms that state they have used the 
fair value option.  For the Performance Statement results, the SH = 1 group excludes those firms that 
present comprehensive income in a performance statement.  For the Fail results, the SH = 1 group 
excludes firms that explicitly state that they elect not to use hedge accounting for any reason.  For the 
Speculation/Trading results, the SH = 1 excludes those firms that explicitly state they only use 
derivatives for risk management.  For the Remeasure results, the SH = 1 group excludes those firms that 
use foreign exchange derivatives to hedge against remeasurement gains and losses on recognized assets 
and liabilities denominated in a foreign currency.  For the Restate results, the SH = 1 group excludes 
firms that have had a previous restatement.  The significance of the difference in means is based on the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.  ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
Baseline 
     
 SH = 0 SH = 1   
Firm Characteristics Mean N Mean N Diff 
Diff in 
Mean 
       
Cash Flow Volatility 0.0377 1701 0.0471 1412 -0.0094 *** 
Earnings Volatility 0.0195 1751 0.0312 1485 -0.0117 *** 
Interest Rate Exposure 0.1128 1667 0.1402 378 -0.0274 * 
Foreign Exchange Exposure 1.1256 1235 1.4208 1152 -0.2952 *** 
Commodities Exposure 1.2551 982 1.2111 837 0.0440 * 
Market Risk 1.0962 1614 1.2963 1343 -0.2001 *** 
Firm-Specific Risk 0.0200 1614 0.0219 1343 -0.0019 *** 
Total Risk 0.4429 1614 0.5012 1343 -0.0583 *** 
       
       
Fair Value Option 
     
 SH = 0 SH = 1   
Firm Characteristics Mean N Mean N Diff 
Diff in 
Mean 
       
Cash Flow Volatility 0.0377 1701 0.0468 1337 -0.0091 *** 
Earnings Volatility 0.0195 1751 0.0321 1395 -0.0126 *** 
Interest Rate Exposure 0.1128 1667 0.1457 346 -0.0329 ** 
Foreign Exchange Exposure 1.1256 1235 1.4183 1086 -0.2927 *** 
Commodities Exposure 1.2551 982 1.2105 812 0.0446 * 
Market Risk 1.0962 1614 1.3142 1255 -0.2180 *** 
Firm-Specific Risk 0.0200 1614 0.0219 1255 -0.0019 *** 
Total Risk 0.4429 1614 0.5045 1255 -0.0616 *** 
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TABLE 1:  Firm-Specific Risk Characteristics (Cont.) 
 
Performance Statement 
     
 SH = 0 SH = 1   
Firm Characteristics Mean N Mean N Diff 
Diff in 
Mean 
       
Cash Flow Volatility 0.0377 1701 0.0502 805 -0.0125 *** 
Earnings Volatility 0.0195 1751 0.0337 824 -0.0142 *** 
Interest Rate Exposure 0.1128 1667 0.1200 183 -0.0072 *** 
Foreign Exchange Exposure 1.1256 1235 1.5224 702 -0.3968 *** 
Commodities Exposure 1.2551 982 1.3216 483 -0.0665 *** 
Market Risk 1.0962 1614 1.2873 761 -0.1911 *** 
Firm-Specific Risk 0.0200 1614 0.0235 761 -0.0035 *** 
Total Risk 0.4429 1614 0.5356 761 -0.0927 *** 
 
 
Fail 
     
 SH = 0 SH = 1   
Firm Characteristics Mean N Mean N Diff 
Diff in 
Mean 
       
Cash Flow Volatility 0.0377 1701 0.0451 871 -0.0074 *** 
Earnings Volatility 0.0195 1751 0.0268 928 -0.0073 *** 
Interest Rate Exposure 0.1128 1667 0.1597 255 -0.0469 ** 
Foreign Exchange Exposure 1.1256 1235 1.4128 743 -0.2872 * 
Commodities Exposure 1.2551 982 1.2279 558 0.0272 * 
Market Risk 1.0962 1614 1.2792 821 -0.1830 *** 
Firm-Specific Risk 0.0200 1614 0.0215 821 -0.0015 *** 
Total Risk 0.4429 1614 0.4930 821 -0.0501 *** 
       
       
Speculation/Trading 
     
 SH = 0 SH = 1   
Firm Characteristics Mean N Mean N Diff 
Diff in 
Mean 
       
Cash Flow Volatility 0.0377 1701 0.0505 257 -0.0128 *** 
Earnings Volatility 0.0195 1751 0.0303 288 -0.0108 *** 
Interest Rate Exposure 0.1128 1667 0.1299 55 -0.0171 *** 
Foreign Exchange Exposure 1.1256 1235 1.0804 96 0.0452  
Commodities Exposure 1.2551 982 1.0416 175 0.2135  
Market Risk 1.0962 1614 1.3418 254 -0.2456 *** 
Firm-Specific Risk 0.0200 1614 0.0206 254 -0.0006 ** 
Total Risk 0.4429 1614 0.4970 254 -0.0541 *** 
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TABLE 1:  Firm-Specific Risk Characteristics (Cont.) 
 
Remeasure 
     
 SH = 0 SH = 1   
Firm Characteristics Mean N Mean N Diff 
Diff in 
Mean 
       
Cash Flow Volatility 0.0377 1701 0.0495 723 -0.0118 *** 
Earnings Volatility 0.0195 1751 0.0375 753 -0.0180 *** 
Interest Rate Exposure 0.1128 1667 0.1742 194 -0.0614 *** 
Foreign Exchange Exposure 1.1256 1235 2.1278 214 -1.0022 *** 
Commodities Exposure 1.2551 982 1.3016 556 -0.0465 *** 
Market Risk 1.0962 1614 1.3657 671 -0.2695 *** 
Firm-Specific Risk 0.0200 1614 0.0230 671 -0.0030 *** 
Total Risk 0.4429 1614 0.5318 671 -0.0889 *** 
       
       
Restate 
     
 SH = 0 SH = 1   
Firm Characteristics Mean N Mean N Diff 
Diff in 
Mean 
       
Cash Flow Volatility 0.0377 1701 0.0491 1155 -0.0114 *** 
Earnings Volatility 0.0195 1751 0.0337 1212 -0.0142 *** 
Interest Rate Exposure 0.1128 1667 0.1392 298 -0.0264  
Foreign Exchange Exposure 1.1256 1235 1.4063 914 -0.2807  
Commodities Exposure 1.2551 982 1.2092 694 0.0459 * 
Market Risk 1.0962 1614 1.2773 1074 -0.1811 *** 
Firm-Specific Risk 0.0200 1614 0.0217 1074 -0.0017 *** 
Total Risk 0.4429 1614 0.4960 1074 -0.0531 *** 
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TABLE 2:  Descriptive Statistics and Correlations – Macroeconomic Exposure and 
Total Firm Risk Analysis 
The descriptive statistics presented below are related to the risk exposure analysis.  
Statistics are presented for the aggregate sample in Panel A.  In Panel B, Pearson 
(Spearman) correlations appear above (below) the diagonal for the aggregate 
samples, by risk exposure variable.  Correlations significant at the 5% level appear  
in bold.  
Panel A – Descriptive Statistics 
       
Interest Rate Exposure Sample 
       
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
VOLE 1927 0.4356 0.2028 0.3875 0.1562 1.0946 
IREXP 1783 -0.0115 0.1421 -0.0109 -0.4728 0.3857 
SIZE 2049 9.1883 1.3718 9.0959 4.4183 12.5097 
LEV 2164 0.6564 0.1870 0.6298 0.2143 1.3627 
BTM 2049 0.3450 2.5976 0.4123 -60.5997 4.0176 
ROE_VOL 2164 0.1699 0.5632 0.0280 0.0053 3.6222 
AGE 1951 36.1445 19.8240 37.0000 4.0000 63.0000 
SGR_VOL 2164 0.1771 0.1893 0.1152 0.0320 1.1457 
INST 1631 0.7431 0.1976 0.7876 0.2043 1.0466 
INVPRC 2049 0.0453 0.0797 0.0264 0.0060 1.1494 
       
Foreign Exchange Rate Exposure Sample 
       
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
VOLE 2245 0.4547 0.2029 0.4090 0.1562 1.0946 
FXEXP 2223 -0.0178 1.5618 -0.0660 -4.0866 4.5080 
SIZE 2346 9.0063 1.1916 8.9845 4.5786 13.2367 
LEV 2418 0.6170 0.2036 0.5972 0.2143 1.3627 
BTM 2346 0.4803 0.3875 0.3994 -2.1925 4.2324 
ROE_VOL 2418 0.1901 0.6286 0.0296 0.0053 3.6222 
AGE 2277 38.2956 19.7631 41.0000 5.0000 63.0000 
SGR_VOL 2418 0.1706 0.1861 0.1151 0.0320 1.1457 
INST 1774 0.7939 0.1351 0.8133 0.2043 1.0466 
INVPRC 2346 0.0395 0.0567 0.0258 0.0060 1.1494 
       
Commodities Price Exposure Sample 
       
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
VOLE 1763 0.4926 0.2237 0.4436 0.1562 1.0946 
COMMEXP 1724 -0.1570 1.5786 -0.0966 -4.6475 4.3010 
SIZE 1820 8.9159 1.2852 8.8304 4.7651 12.5097 
LEV 1876 0.6448 0.1837 0.6105 0.2436 1.3627 
BTM 1820 0.4349 2.7976 0.4947 -60.5997 4.2324 
ROE_VOL 1876 0.1879 0.5587 0.0414 0.0053 3.6222 
AGE 1780 36.9663 20.2335 37.0000 4.0000 63.0000 
SGR_VOL 1876 0.2058 0.2037 0.1398 0.0367 1.1457 
INST 1477 0.7777 0.1723 0.8015 0.2043 1.0466 
INVPRC 1820 0.0491 0.1307 0.0269 0.0060 2.8571 
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TABLE 2:  Descriptive Statistics and Correlations – Macroeconomic Exposure and Total Firm Risk (Cont.) 
Panel B - Correlations 
           
Interest Rate Exposure Sample 
           
 VOLE IREXP SIZE LEV BTM ROE_VOL AGE SGR_VOL INST INVPRC 
VOLE 1.0000 -0.1239 -0.4904 0.1434 0.3098 0.1313 -0.2281 0.1351 0.2207 0.3810 
IREXP -0.1096 1.0000 0.1012 0.0358 -0.1115 -0.0687 0.1062 -0.1028 -0.0601 -0.0733 
SIZE -0.4996 0.1062 1.0000 -0.2309 0.1257 0.0009 0.3319 -0.1277 -0.2193 -0.3158 
LEV 0.0939 0.0461 -0.2099 1.0000 -0.3320 0.3852 0.1230 -0.0635 -0.0377 0.3421 
BTM 0.3796 -0.0464 -0.4186 -0.2745 1.0000 -0.0277 -0.1764 0.0688 0.2377 -0.3485 
ROE_VOL 0.3372 -0.0602 -0.1839 0.5070 -0.1996 1.0000 0.0145 0.0481 0.0142 0.2863 
AGE -0.2856 0.1080 0.3613 0.0927 -0.2341 -0.0712 1.0000 -0.2030 -0.0320 -0.0636 
SGR_VOL 0.2386 -0.0361 -0.1672 -0.0579 0.2201 0.3787 -0.2375 1.0000 -0.0028 -0.0206 
INST 0.2939 -0.0967 -0.3722 0.0407 0.2208 0.1178 -0.1629 -0.0241 1.0000 -0.0752 
INVPRC 0.4162 0.0893 -0.3831 0.3200 0.3434 0.1996 -0.0963 0.0334 0.1258 1.0000 
           
Foreign Exchange Rate Exposure Sample 
           
 VOLE FXEXP SIZE LEV BTM ROE_VOL AGE SGR_VOL INST INVPRC 
VOLE 1.0000 -0.0751 -0.4715 0.2061 0.2205 0.1094 -0.0960 0.1505 0.0745 0.3629 
FXEXP -0.0465 1.0000 -0.0636 0.0792 -0.0926 0.0048 0.0302 -0.0279 -0.0876 0.1207 
SIZE -0.4736 -0.0585 1.0000 -0.2484 -0.3163 -0.0922 0.0811 -0.1447 -0.1918 -0.3892 
LEV 0.1360 0.0607 -0.2357 1.0000 -0.2954 0.4273 0.2535 0.0681 0.0063 0.2953 
BTM 0.2847 -0.0611 -0.3651 -0.2937 1.0000 -0.2936 -0.1086 0.1065 -0.0868 0.1812 
ROE_VOL 0.3613 0.0019 -0.2137 0.5456 -0.2665 1.0000 0.0387 0.1974 -0.0409 0.2351 
AGE -0.1639 0.0507 0.1126 0.2534 -0.0935 0.1006 1.0000 -0.0244 -0.1494 0.0228 
SGR_VOL 0.2908 -0.0056 -0.1920 0.0426 0.1923 0.4035 0.0243 1.0000 -0.0450 0.2046 
INST 0.1546 -0.0586 -0.2566 -0.0136 -0.0315 -0.0439 -0.2106 -0.0757 1.0000 -0.1009 
INVPRC 0.4319 0.1520 -0.4770 0.3980 0.2411 0.3067 0.0534 0.1495 0.0434 1.0000 
           
Commodities Price Exposure Sample 
           
 VOLE COMMEXP SIZE LEV BTM ROE_VOL AGE SGR_VOL INST INVPRC 
VOLE 1.0000 0.0045 -0.4349 0.2175 0.0598 0.0439 -0.1318 0.0766 0.1870 0.3606 
COMMEXP 0.0120 1.0000 -0.0068 -0.0533 0.1586 -0.0194 -0.0489 0.0927 0.1042 -0.0922 
SIZE -0.4221 -0.0335 1.0000 -0.2989 0.1021 -0.0012 0.2586 -0.0023 -0.2146 -0.3356 
LEV 0.1210 -0.0037 -0.2844 1.0000 -0.2745 0.4506 0.2759 -0.1856 0.0732 0.3192 
BTM 0.2163 0.0984 -0.3450 -0.3248 1.0000 -0.0653 -0.0844 0.0997 0.0484 -0.8351 
ROE_VOL 0.3350 0.0031 -0.0777 0.3954 -0.1987 1.0000 0.2277 -0.0384 -0.0370 0.0486 
AGE -0.2027 -0.0213 0.2759 0.2265 -0.3586 0.0407 1.0000 -0.2568 -0.0689 -0.0324 
SGR_VOL 0.1978 0.0442 0.0717 -0.2500 0.3046 0.3986 -0.3084 1.0000 -0.0291 -0.0432 
INST 0.2279 0.1196 -0.3046 0.0627 0.0501 0.1229 -0.1772 0.0992 1.0000 -0.0544 
INVPRC 0.3937 -0.0017 -0.5316 0.4025 0.2620 0.2229 -0.0841 -0.0201 0.0218 1.0000 
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TABLE 3: Macroeconomic Exposure and Total Firm Risk 
This table presents the results of the estimation of Equation (1) VOLEi,t = θ0 + θ1EXPOSUREi,t + Σθ2-kCONTROLSi,t + ε, for SH=0 and SH=1.  All variables of 
interest are as described in Appendix A.  SH is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms with 50% or more of their firm-quarter observations in the 4th or 5th 
quintile of observations ranked by either the baseline partitioning measure (Model 1) or the baseline measure augmented to exclude from the 4th and 5th 
quintiles firms that exercise the fair value option (Model 2), firms that report comprehensive income in a performance statement (Model 3) and firms that 
use FX derivatives to hedge against remeasurement gains and losses on recognized assets and liabilities denominated in a foreign currency (Model 4).  P-
values (two-sided) are based on heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors.  All non-logorithmic variables were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Panel A – Interest Rate Exposure Sample 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 SH = 0 SH = 1 SH = 1 SH = 1 SH = 1 
Variable Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
                
INTERCEPT 0.8097 *** <.0001 0.7239 *** 0.00 1.0893 *** <.0001 1.6260 *** <.0001 0.9702 *** <.0001 
IREXP -0.0631 * 0.09 -0.1513  0.13 -0.1083  0.35 0.0434  0.80 0.0671  0.64 
SIZE -0.0610 *** <.0001 -0.0510 *** <.0001 -0.0682 *** <.0001 -0.0957 *** <.0001 -0.0064  0.72 
LEV 0.1321 *** 0.01 0.0395  0.80 -0.2424  0.13 0.0331  0.85 -1.0074 *** <.0001 
BTM 0.0707 *** <.0001 -0.0856 ** 0.05 -0.1803 *** <.0001 -0.2297 *** <.0001 -0.1774 *** 0.00 
ROE_VOL -0.0034  0.76 0.0096  0.77 -0.0675  0.44 0.0187  0.84 0.0661  0.58 
AGE 0.0003  0.21 -0.0007  0.59 -0.0019  0.11 -0.0056 *** 0.00 -0.0021  0.15 
SGR_VOL -0.0202  0.43 0.1157 ** 0.02 0.1680 *** 0.00 0.3638 *** 0.00 0.0853  0.16 
INST 0.0325  0.26 0.3029 *** <.0001 0.2835 *** <.0001 -0.1338  0.20 0.2993 *** <.0001 
INVPRC 0.5720 *** <.0001 1.7496 *** 0.01 3.3529 *** <.0001 3.4844 *** 0.00 4.7261 *** 0.00 
                
Obs. 1,203   258   228   130   149   
R-Square 0.40   0.36   0.37   0.49   0.35   
                
Panel B – Foreign Exchange Rate Exposure Sample 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 SH = 0 SH = 1 SH = 1 SH = 1 SH = 1 
Variable Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
                
INTERCEPT 0.7843 *** <.0001 0.8836 *** <.0001 0.9401 *** <.0001 1.0390 *** <.0001 1.0647 *** <.0001 
FXEXP -0.0043  0.36 -0.0232 *** <.0001 -0.0241 *** <.0001 -0.0250 *** <.0001 -0.0123  0.29 
SIZE -0.0503 *** <.0001 -0.0570 *** <.0001 -0.0607 *** <.0001 -0.0691 *** <.0001 -0.0639 *** 0.00 
LEV 0.0811 ** 0.04 0.0745  0.12 0.0240  0.65 -0.0078  0.90 -0.2308  0.28 
BTM 0.0675 *** 0.01 0.0066  0.70 -0.0006  0.97 -0.0343  0.16 -0.1535 *** 0.00 
ROE_VOL 0.2036 *** 0.00 -0.0067  0.50 -0.0268 *** 0.00 -0.0226 * 0.07 -0.0158  0.66 
AGE -0.0010 *** 0.00 -0.0004  0.21 -0.0008 ** 0.02 -0.0008 * 0.07 0.0024 ** 0.03 
SGR_VOL 0.0717 ** 0.02 0.0396  0.51 0.0433  0.47 0.1051  0.30 0.5316 *** 0.01 
INST 0.0431  0.53 0.0416  0.31 0.0842 ** 0.05 0.0713  0.17 -0.1474 ** 0.05 
INVPRC 0.4955 ** 0.02 0.9293 *** <.0001 0.8929 *** <.0001 1.6768 *** <.0001 5.0329 *** <.0001 
                
Obs. 873   839   782   558   146   
R-Square 0.35   0.25   0.26   0.28   0.36   
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TABLE 3:  Macroeconomic Exposure and Total Firm Risk (Cont.) 
                
Panel C – Dependent Variable = Economic Risk 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 SH = 0 SH = 1 SH = 1 SH = 1 SH = 1 
Variable Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
                
INTERCEPT 1.1414 *** <.0001 0.9540 *** <.0001 0.9362 *** <.0001 1.1268 *** <.0001 1.0183 *** <.0001 
COMMEXP -0.0058  0.21 0.0153 *** 0.00 0.0148 *** 0.00 0.0251 *** <.0001 0.0265 *** <.0001 
SIZE -0.0953 *** <.0001 -0.0523 *** <.0001 -0.0498 *** <.0001 -0.0609 *** <.0001 -0.0388 *** <.0001 
LEV 0.1088 * 0.08 -0.1707 *** 0.01 -0.1777 *** 0.01 -0.0840  0.37 -0.5129 *** <.0001 
BTM -0.0178  0.42 -0.0735 *** 0.00 -0.0690 *** 0.00 -0.0764 ** 0.02 -0.0470 * 0.10 
ROE_VOL -0.0410 *** <.0001 0.0646 *** 0.00 0.1351 ** 0.02 0.1727 *** 0.01 0.2060 *** 0.00 
AGE 0.0014 *** 0.00 -0.0004  0.26 -0.0004  0.34 -0.0008  0.17 -0.0010 * 0.07 
SGR_VOL 0.2598 *** <.0001 -0.0149  0.61 -0.0376  0.21 -0.1991 *** <.0001 -0.0250  0.42 
INST 0.0095  0.85 0.2339 *** <.0001 0.2249 *** <.0001 0.1492 *** 0.00 0.2045 *** <.0001 
INVPRC 0.5817 *** 0.01 0.7151 *** <.0001 0.8249 *** <.0001 0.7402 *** 0.00 1.0123 ** 0.02 
                
Obs. 791   616   586   360   422   
R-Square 0.34   0.26   0.26   0.31   0.25   
  38 
TABLE 4:  Descriptive Statistics and Correlations – Information Environment and 
Shareholder Base Analysis 
The descriptive statistics presented below are related to the information environment/shareholder base analysis.  
Statistics are presented for the aggregate sample (Panel A) and sample means are provided by the categorical 
variable RANK (Panel B).  Firm-quarters are classified based on the ratio of derivative assets and liabilities 
designated as accounting hedges to derivative assets and liabilities not designated as accounting hedges.  RANK = 1 
when all derivative contracts for that observation are designated as accounting hedges.  RANK = 5 when none of 
the derivative contracts for that observation are designated as accounting hedges.  The remaining observations are 
approximately equally distributed between RANK = 2-4. In Panel C, Pearson (Spearman) Correlations appear 
above (below) the diagonal for the aggregate sample.  Correlations significant at the 5% level are in bold. 
     
Panel A – Aggregate Sample Statistics     
           
Variable N Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Median Minimum Maximum     
SMOOTH1 1888 -0.5514 0.2912 -0.5211 -1.2624 -0.1024     
SMOOTH2 1888 0.7745 0.2574 0.8806 -0.1104 0.9950     
FCAST_ERROR 1888 -0.0033 0.0054 -0.0016 -0.0345 0.0000     
ANALYST 
FOLLOW 
1888 16.6075 7.4753 16.0000 2.0000 45.0000 
    
FCAST_DISP 1888 -0.0856 0.2714 -0.0500 -1.6667 0.9000     
AGE 1888 41.0715 19.0465 48.0000 4.0000 63.0000     
SPREAD 1888 -0.0180 0.0152 -0.0127 -0.1145 -0.0095     
TRANS 1888 4.4504 1.3955 4.4286 0.5714 7.8571     
TURNOVER 1888 13.5737 10.5486 10.3228 2.2590 65.2903     
SIZE 1888 9.2463 1.2769 9.1330 5.7176 12.5097     
LEV 1888 0.5983 0.1750 0.5860 0.2126 1.0188     
INTCOV 1888 25.5520 64.8830 11.0970 -2.5440 536.0000     
MB 1888 3.3095 3.4355 2.3491 -1.8073 21.6427     
           
 
Panel B – Means By Rank 
      
 RANK = 1 RANK = 2 RANK = 3 RANK = 4 RANK = 5 
Variable N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 
           
SMOOTH1 379 -0.5710 433 -0.4977 466 -0.4759 412 -0.5666 198 -0.7776 
SMOOTH2 379 0.7661 433 0.8327 466 0.8375 412 0.7311 198 0.6058 
FCAST_ 
ERROR 
379 -0.0040 433 -0.0023 466 -0.0025 412 -0.0039 198 -0.0054 
ANALYST 
FOLLOW 
379 16.4486 433 17.6236 466 16.4936 412 15.1481 198 17.9950 
FCAST_DISP 379 -0.0706 433 -0.0632 466 -0.0761 412 -0.1096 198 -0.1361 
AGE 379 35.9736 433 44.0139 466 45.9270 412 42.1165 198 30.7929 
SPREAD 379 -0.0178 433 -0.0184 466 -0.0178 412 -0.0175 198 -0.0187 
TRANS 379 4.1941 433 4.8908 466 4.9013 412 4.2396 198 3.3557 
TURNOVER 379 13.5820 433 11.6062 466 10.9150 412 14.9483 198 21.2577 
SIZE 379 8.7410 433 9.4704 466 9.6232 412 9.2215 198 8.8885 
LEV 379 0.6120 433 0.5941 466 0.6207 412 0.5731 198 0.5811 
INTCOV 379 33.2177 433 30.2190 466 25.4890 412 19.3275 198 13.7729 
MB 379 3.4858 433 4.0893 466 3.8264 412 2.4871 198 1.7612 
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TABLE 4:  Descriptive Statistics and Correlations – Information Environment and Shareholder Base Analysis (Cont.) 
 
Panel C – Pearson (Spearman) Correlations above (below) 
              
 SMOOTH1 SMOOTH2 
FCAST_ 
ERROR 
ANALYST 
FOLLOW 
FCAST_ 
DISP 
AGE SPREAD TRANS 
SHARE 
T/O 
SIZE LEV INTCOV MB 
SMOOTH1 1.0000 0.8950 0.1964 -0.1992 -0.0060 0.2084 -0.0254 0.6185 -0.2846 -0.0033 0.1719 0.0244 0.1163 
SMOOTH2 0.9739 1.0000 0.1927 -0.1681 -0.0016 0.2163 -0.0236 0.5752 -0.2427 0.0383 0.1644 0.0029 0.0812 
FCAST_ERROR 0.1157 0.1012 1.0000 0.1581 0.0025 0.0512 -0.0082 0.3789 -0.4394 0.3467 -0.1876 0.0770 0.1451 
ANALYST 
FOLLOW 
-0.2385 -0.2434 0.1851 1.0000 -0.0069 -0.2939 -0.0263 0.1603 0.0558 0.4707 -0.3467 0.2724 -0.0131 
FCAST_DISP 0.0555 0.0531 0.2597 0.0241 1.0000 0.0771 0.0060 0.2218 -0.0812 0.0709 0.0189 0.0254 0.0909 
AGE 0.1998 0.1895 0.1587 -0.2026 0.2039 1.0000 0.2156 0.4939 -0.1544 0.2547 0.2794 -0.0892 0.2495 
SPREAD 0.0040 0.0115 0.0260 0.1116 0.0880 0.2783 1.0000 0.2860 -0.0503 0.1078 0.1628 -0.1074 0.0365 
TRANS 0.6158 0.6066 0.5330 0.1777 0.4892 0.5227 0.4285 1.0000 -0.3516 0.4283 0.1373 0.0653 0.2700 
SHARE 
T/O 
-0.2040 -0.1920 -0.4041 0.0276 -0.2972 -0.2744 -0.0455 -0.4108 1.0000 -0.3657 0.0622 -0.0229 -0.1965 
SIZE -0.0380 -0.0351 0.3819 0.5143 0.1892 0.2939 0.1720 0.4310 -0.4539 1.0000 -0.2130 0.1576 0.1899 
LEV 0.2238 0.2485 -0.1271 -0.3139 0.0525 0.2707 0.1463 0.1418 0.0857 -0.2216 1.0000 -0.3567 0.4224 
INTCOV 0.0068 -0.0223 0.2971 0.3809 0.1458 0.0563 -0.0485 0.2544 -0.3106 0.4945 -0.5640 1.0000 0.0310 
MB 0.1339 0.1390 0.3477 0.1933 0.2933 0.2220 -0.0183 0.3893 -0.3310 0.4310 0.2202 0.3300 1.0000 
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TABLE 5:  Information Environment and Shareholder Base 
This table presents the results of the estimation of Equation (2): 
RANK = Ψ0 + Ψ1TRANSi,t + Ψ2TURNOVERi,t + Ψ3SIZEi,t+ Ψ4LEVERAGEi,t + Ψ5INTCOVi,t + Ψ6MBi,t + ε. 
All variables are as described in Appendix A.   Model 1 provides multinomial logit coefficient estimates obtained from the aggregated baseline 
partitions.  Models 2 through 4 provide multinomial logit coefficient estimates obtained from aggregated partitions excluding from the 4th and 5th 
quintiles firms that exercise the fair value option (Model 2), firms that report comprehensive income in a performance statement (Model 3), firms that 
use FX derivatives to hedge against remeasurement gains and losses on recognized assets and liabilities denominated in a foreign currency (Model 4).  
Estimates of ψ2<0 would provide evidence in support of hypothesis 4.  All non-logorithmic variables were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  ***, 
**, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
              
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Var RANK Estimate 
Pr > 
ChiSq Estimate 
Pr > 
ChiSq Estimate 
Pr > 
ChiSq Estimate 
Pr > 
ChiSq 
              
TRANS 1 0.4866 *** <.0001 0.4798 *** <.0001 0.4606 *** <.0001 0.7803 *** <.0001 
TRANS 2 0.7648 *** <.0001 0.7597 *** <.0001 0.7259 *** <.0001 1.0847 *** <.0001 
TRANS 3 0.6847 *** <.0001 0.6829 *** <.0001 0.6423 *** <.0001 1.0186 *** <.0001 
TRANS 4 0.4724 *** <.0001 0.4571 *** <.0001 0.3959 *** 0.00 0.3922 *** 0.00 
              
TURNOVER 1 -0.0427 *** <.0001 -0.0404 *** <.0001 -0.0585 *** <.0001 -0.0486 *** <.0001 
TURNOVER 2 -0.0366 *** <.0001 -0.0345 *** <.0001 -0.0538 *** <.0001 -0.0444 *** <.0001 
TURNOVER 3 -0.0492 *** <.0001 -0.0467 *** <.0001 -0.0665 *** <.0001 -0.0573 *** <.0001 
TURNOVER 4 -0.0175 *** 0.01 -0.0176 *** 0.01 -0.0367 *** <.0001 -0.016 * 0.10 
              
SIZE 1 -0.6995 *** <.0001 -0.6899 *** <.0001 -0.3742 *** 0.00 -0.6881 *** <.0001 
SIZE 2 -0.3142 *** 0.00 -0.3101 *** 0.00 -0.0074  0.95 -0.3218 *** 0.007 
SIZE 3 -0.1355  0.15 -0.1343  0.15 0.1710  0.18 -0.1579  0.18 
SIZE 4 -0.1674 * 0.07 -0.1574 * 0.09 0.0718  0.58 0.1055  0.40 
              
LEV 1 -0.3475  0.61 -0.2318  0.74 0.2990  0.72 0.2973  0.74 
LEV 2 -1.3531 ** 0.05 -1.2204 * 0.08 -0.6960  0.41 -0.7344  0.42 
LEV 3 0.7751  0.26 0.8847  0.20 1.4050 * 0.09 1.3705  0.13 
LEV 4 -0.8160  0.22 -0.5574  0.41 -0.8632  0.30 -1.6201 * 0.09 
              
INTCOV 1 0.0068 ** 0.05 0.0068 * 0.06 0.0071  0.14 0.0114 * 0.10 
INTCOV 2 0.0044  0.21 0.0044  0.22 0.0047  0.32 0.0089  0.20 
INTCOV 3 0.0049  0.16 0.0049  0.17 0.0052  0.27 0.0095  0.17 
INTCOV 4 0.0014  0.70 0.0003  0.95 0.0018  0.72 0.0051  0.48 
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TABLE 5:  Information Environment and Shareholder Base – Cont. 
              
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Var RANK Est. 
Pr > 
ChiSq Est. 
Pr > 
ChiSq Est. 
Pr > 
ChiSq Est. 
Pr > 
ChiSq 
              
MB 1 0.3545 *** <.0001 0.3687 *** <.0001 0.1624 ** 0.02 0.3928 *** <.0001 
MB 2 0.3790 *** <.0001 0.3920 *** <.0001 0.1856 *** 0.01 0.4138 *** <.0001 
MB 3 0.3046 *** <.0001 0.3179 *** <.0001 0.1100  0.13 0.3349 *** 0.00 
MB 4 0.2064 *** 0.00 0.2244 *** 0.00 0.0468  0.54 -0.3472 *** 0.00 
              
Obs.  1888   1852   1687   1580   
Pseudo R2  0.08   0.08   0.08   0.13   
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APPENDIX:  VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
 
 
Variable Name 
 
Variable Definition 
SPECULATIVE 
HEDGER (SH) 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm-quarter observation is in 
quintile 4 or 5, i.e. firm-quarters with the smallest portion of 
derivative assets and liabilities designated as accounting hedges, 0 
otherwise.  For the Risk Exposure analysis, the variable is a fixed 
firm characteristic and only equals 1 when 50% or more of a firm’s 
quarterly observations fall into the 4th and 5th quintiles of 
observations with the greatest portion of derivative assets and 
liabilities designated as accounting hedges. 
RANK 
Categorical variable equal to 1-5 with 1 assigned to firm-quarters 
with all derivatives designated as accounting hedges and 5 assigned 
to firm-quarters with no derivatives designated as accounting 
hedges. 
TRANS 
The average decile rank of SMOOTH1, SMOOTH2, FCAST_ERROR, 
ANALYST FOLLOW, FCAST_DISP, AGE and SPREAD. 
SMOOTH1 
The standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items 
scaled by average total assets divided by the standard deviation of 
cash flow from operations scaled by average total assets multiplied 
by -1 so larger values represent smoother earnings. 
SMOOTH2 
The correlation between the cash flow from operations scaled by 
average total assets and total accruals scaled by average total 
assets with the correlation coefficient multiplied by a -1 so that 
larger values represent smoother earnings. 
FCAST_ERROR 
The absolute value of the forecast error scaled by the stock price at 
the end of the prior fiscal quarter multiplied by -1.  Forecast error is 
the I/B/E/S analysts’ mean annual earnings forecast less the actual 
earnings as reported by I/B/E/S. 
ANALYST FOLLOW The number of analysts making a forecast for quarter t’s earnings. 
FCAST_DISP 
The coefficient of variation of analysts’ forecasts, i.e. the standard 
deviation of forecast for the fiscal quarter scaled by the mean 
estimate, both reported by I/B/E/S, multiplied by -1 so larger 
values represent a more transparent information environment. 
AGE 
The number of fiscal years accounting data is available in 
Compustat 
SPREAD 
The quarterly average of the absolute difference between the closing 
bid and ask price obtained from CRSP, multiplied by -1 so larger 
values represent a more transparent information environment. 
TURNOVER 
The quarterly average of share volume scaled by the number of 
shares outstanding obtained from CRSP 
CFO_VOL 
The standard deviation of operating cash flows scaled by average 
total assets where standard deviations are calculated using 5 years, 
20 quarters, of data.  Operating cash flows are calculated as 
earnings before extraordinary items less total accruals.  Total 
accruals equal ΔCurrent Assets – ΔCurrent Liabilities – ΔCash + 
ΔShort-Term Debt - Depreciation. 
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EARN_VOL 
The standard deviation of earnings before extraordinary items 
scaled by average total assets where standard deviations are 
calculated using 5 years, 20 quarters, of data. 
BETA 
The market-model beta estimated using daily returns over quarters 
t-7 to t. 
FIRMRSK 
The standard deviation of the residuals from the regressions used to 
estimate beta. 
TOTAL RISK 
The standard deviation of firm returns estimated using daily 
returns over quarters t-7 to t. 
IREXPOSURE, 
FXEXPOSURE, 
COMMEXPOSURE 
Exposure to interest rate, foreign exchange and commodities price 
risk is estimated for each firm-quarter observation by estimating 
the following regression via ordinary least squares:   
Ri,t = λ0i + λ1iRmt + λ2iMacrot + λi,t 
where Ri,t is the cumulative raw return for firm i in month t; Rm,t is 
the value-weighted market portfolio return in month t; and Macrot 
is one of three macroeconomic variables with serve as proxies for 
interest rate risk, foreign currency risk and commodity price risk.  
The interest rate proxy is the monthly percentage change in LIBOR.  
The foreign currency risk proxy is the monthly percentage change 
in the Federal Reserve Board trade-weighted index which measures 
the strength of the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies of the 
index.  The commodity price risk proxy is the monthly percentage 
change in the consumer price index of all commodities.  The 
absolute value of the coefficient λ2i captures the firm exposure to the 
risk factor in each period.  The exposure variable is a firm-specific 
variable estimated using month t-23 to month t returns. 
MTB Market value of equity divided by book value of equity. 
SIZE The natural log of market value of equity 
LEV Total liabilities divided by total assets 
INTCOV Interest expense divided by operating income before depreciation 
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